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From Mellmott to Madoff:
History in the (Re) Making
“History” has never enjoyed a peaceful existence. There has 
been a constant struggle over the primacy of ideas. The tacit 
agenda of mainstream history is often to elevate the version of 
the victors and to defend the status quo. A few years ago, doc-
toral students attending an American Accounting Association 
(AAA) colloquium were informed by an eminent, tenured profes-
sor that nothing in The Accounting Review (TAR) older than five 
years was worth reading.1
Editors of TAR and the Journal of Accounting Research 
(JAR) did not always express such distain for past scholarship. 
JAR was a joint creation of the University of Chicago and the 
London School of Economics (LSE). The latter was dominated 
by historians such as Will Baxter and Harold Edey. Their gradu-
ate disciples came to dominate chair appointments in the U.K. 
and beyond. Most notable were Peter Bird, Sir Brian Carsberg, 
David Solomons, Robert Parker, Geoffrey Harcourt, and Tony 
Lowe. 
While archivalism/empiricism typified the research focus 
of the LSE’s “Godfather-Originals” (Edey and Baxter), their 
first-generation students diversified into quite eclectic direc-
tions (managerial economics [Sir Brian Carsberg]; managerial 
economics, philosophy, general systems theory, and cybernet-
ics [Tony Lowe]; and, inter alia, income theory and economics 
[Robert Parker]). 
The transition from history to market studies proceeded at 
different speeds in JAR and TAR. TAR, a “public society” jour-
nal, was slower to embrace market studies and abandon history. 
1  We challenge any reader to recall the titles and authors of the first article of 
the first 2005 issue of TAR.
1
Sy and Tinker: From Mellmott to Madoff: History in the (re) making
Published by eGrove, 2011
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2011142
However, 1965 marked a turning point in bringing TAR to heel. 
Pressure from the then Big Eight accounting firms and their 
clients forced the editor of TAR to tell Abraham Briloff “never to 
submit his work to TAR again” [Tinker and Puxty, 1995]. Briloff 
was the bête noire of the Big Eight and their clients.2 
The capitulation of TAR to market forces was accomplished 
directly and indirectly. Directly, the AAA became increasingly de-
pendent on non-membership fees as a source of revenue [Tinker, 
2001]. Indirectly, the Big Eight and their clients colonized the 
professoriate with funding of chairs and research. This gave a 
“chosen few” an elevated status and access to research finance 
and, therefore, publications. This “edge” allowed market-friend-
ly professors access to positions of influence via publications, 
editorial-board memberships, and executive-committee appoint-
ments at the AAA [Williams, 1980, 1985]. 
The rush to “market” was a lot easier for a private journal 
like JAR under the tutelage of its editor, Nicholas Dopuch. 
Dopuch was based at the (private) University of Chicago that 
openly courts market sources of funding from the Big Eight, 
their clients, and anyone else willing to pay. Private sources are 
the lifeblood of private universities. 
Dopuch had no qualms about dumping JAR’s connection 
with the LSE’s quaint history and adopting a new research order 
of pseudo-scientific rigor of regression-based market studies. As 
shown later, this self-declared brand of positivism and empiri-
cism in accounting is philosophically naïve [Tinker et al., 1982; 
Christenson, 1983]. 
Importantly, for historians who might lament the demise of 
accounting history, as Marx pointed some 160 years earlier, the 
struggle for ideas was no longer an intellectual contest about the 
merits of ideas, but had been replaced by “prizefighters” [Marx, 
1977, afterword]. For Marx, from around 1850 onward, the mar-
ket was beginning to assimilate “political economy.” 
Changes in the accounting realm were accompanied by 
parallel movements elsewhere in the university. In the U.S, the 
Cyert Report elevated the business school MBA as the premier 
qualification for populating the upper echelons of America’s cor-
porate management.3 In the U.K, there were no indigenous busi-
2  Briloff promptly switched to Barron’s to continue his critique of the Big 
Eight and their corporate clients. With a much larger circulation than any aca-
demic journal, TAR’s rejection was a blessing in disguise. 
3  The insertion of “business” into the U.S. university campus was not accept-
ed without reservation. To this day, Harvard University only allows the Harvard 
Business School to award a DBA, not a Ph.D. 
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ness schools of consequence; economics departments typically 
controlled any business and accounting curricula. Accordingly, 
the U.K. government provided seed-money of £30 million to 
establish the Manchester and London Business Schools. These 
were the bellwethers for others to follow. One consequence of 
this growing commodification of U.K. education was the eclipse 
of economic history, epitomized by the decline of history at the 
LSE which has been replaced there as a training ground for the 
sons and daughters of the rich and famous around the globe.4 
History, philosophy, and “the classics” no longer appear on 
the usual business doctoral curriculum. Aristotle, Plato, and 
Socrates are dead and buried. These, and their fellow texts, 
have been displaced by “modern math” that has erected its own 
hermeneutically sealed, home-spun standards of “relevance,” 
“truth,” “validity,” etc. Mainstream market studies routinely 
report R-squares, often of minuscule explanatory size, as “con-
firmation” that their hypotheses have not been rejected and, 
therefore by implication, remain “true.” 
These tests are nicely isolated from the established stan-
dards of epistemic appraisal [Whitley, 1972, 1973, 1986]. Even 
Karl Popper [1957], a conservative philosopher of note, dem-
onstrates that any brand of empiricism/positivism that seeks 
to “confirm” an hypothesis is not tenable from a philosophical 
perspective. In his Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper argues 
that the empirical finding of one black swan (analogous for us 
to a failed bank with a particular leverage ratio) does not allow 
a researcher to conclude that all swans are black (or that all 
banks with a particular leverage ratio are doomed). Inference to 
a truth statement is a fallacious philosophy.5
Market-studies confirmationalists perpetrate tests that are 
akin to trying to affirm/confirm that finding one purple swan 
reinforces the dogma that all swans might be purple. This has 
the convenient ideological purpose of affirming the status quo, 
including the tacit thesis of market studies. The monotonous re-
use of regression studies with familiar market variables tacitly 
affirms that the market is equilibrating and therefore working 
well in providing a proper allocation of society’s resources and 
4  Seventy % of LSE students are now from wealthy overseas families. The 
LSE is now the intellectual West Point (Sandhurst) of the U.K., training the next 
generation of an indigenous elite that is friendly to the West. 
5  For Popper, researchers should frame their hypothesis for refutation and 
strive to refute the thesis with evidence. So, for instance, a hypothesis framed that 
there are no purple swans that is refuted by the discovery of a purple swan allows 
the researcher to conclude definitively that the hypothesis is refuted. 
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functions best without regulatory interference. 
Confirmationism serves mainstream accountants by pro-
tecting the reigning dogma (market studies). As long as the 
contention that markets are “okay,” there is no need to consider 
“inferior” literatures (history) that can be dismissed as “not de 
rigueur.” Dissident research is censored because it might sup-
plant the mainstream sovereign thesis and provide the tools for 
unearthing “disturbing truths” that would trouble the status 
quo. 
The so-called top three journals, JAR, JAE, and TAR, all 
play the same jingle, expressed in their own allegorical form and 
delivering the same message with resounding consistency that 
markets are “good” because they are efficient and are the best 
adjudicators for promoting the social good (with the corollary 
that state interference and regulation are “bad”). What is mini-
mized and excluded by this sovereign position [Ryan, 1982] are 
contrary viewpoints, those expressed in public interest, taxation, 
interest, gender issues, history, management accounting, etc. 
[Whitley, 1972, 1973, 1986; Tinker, 2001].
In the mid-19th century, Marx produced his opus Capital 
[Vol. 1, 1977]. Adverse to the popular ideology, Capital is not a 
eulogy to Communism, living socialism, or any other version of 
“Mickey-Marxism” [Tinker, 1999]. These were self-serving ap-
propriations by dictators and mass murderers who, according to 
modern historians, never actually read Capital. 
Fortunately, there is a change of heart regarding the lit-
eratures (including history) that are relevant to deciphering the 
present. Desperate times call for desperate measures, and in the 
intellectual realm, this means accepting the unacceptable. And if 
the New York Times issues an edit, it is worthy of attention: 
The financial meltdown has sent the literary-minded 
scurrying back to the classics for insight and suc-
cor. The dastardly exploits of the Ponzi artist Bernie 
Madoff call to mind The Last Tycoon (Fitzgerald and 
Wilson, 1941) or The Way We Live Now (Anthony Trol-
lope, 1941). At a time when hard-core free-marketeers 
like Richard Posner (2009) are questioning the efficacy 
of capitalism, the works of Karl Marx are being fished 
out of the dustbin of history. Most classic critiques of 
capitalism are much-mentioned but little read, the sort 
of books people routinely cite without really knowing 
what’s in them [Daniel Gross, 2009]. 
Anthony Trollope wrote The Way We Live Now in the 1850s. 
His anti-hero, Augustus Melmotte, pre-dated Ponzi by 80 years 
4
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and Madoff by over 150 years. If scholars and regulators had 
read Trollope, Madoff might have been on their radar screens 
and many other con-artists who preceded him. 
Melmotte’s scam was far more outlandish than Madoff’s 
operation; indeed, by comparison, Madoff’s operation appears 
quite amateurish. Madoff preyed on Jewish philanthropic organi- 
zations, the Jewish communities in New York, and the snow-
birds who flock to Palm Beach to escape the northeast winter. 
Melmotte entered London society with a dubious pedigree. 
He was a foreigner with a murky past who left Paris under the 
shadow of a financial scandal. On his arrival in London, Mel-
motte underwent a complete makeover, burying all traces of his 
past dossier and weaving his magic by playing on the greed of 
the English landed gentry. Many of the latter were under finan-
cial distress because the primary source of their wealth, agricul-
ture, was in the doldrums because of the influx of cheap corn 
imports as a result of the Corn Laws.6
The landed gentry were desperate for new opportunities 
to rectify their deteriorating financial condition. Melmotte ap-
peared on the London scene like a knight in shining armor. 
Like Madoff, he promised gullible investors spectacular returns. 
Melmotte used the promise of undreamt riches from a railroad 
venture connecting the U.S. to Mexico. Of course, unbeknownst 
to the investors, not a line of rail track was ever laid. Instead, in-
vestor monies were used to create an aura of matchless success. 
Melmotte took care to assuage any doubts about the integ-
rity of his activities by displaying all the trappings of success, 
providing comfort and reassurance to all those who had unwit-
tingly bankrolled his venture. Madoff used his wealth to secure 
gold-brick credentials. He built a new mansion in the center of 
London, unparalleled in splendor and extravagance. He spared 
no expense on the furnishing. He invited London’s upper-crust 
to a banquet celebrating the opening of his new mansion, star-
ring the Emperor of China. He financed a coming-out ball for 
his daughter to launch her into English society and to introduce 
her to eligible marital suitors. Finally, Melmotte used “other 
peoples’ money” to bankroll a successful run for a seat in Parlia-
ment. Melmotte was “gold” and Londoners flocked to share in 
his success. 
6  The Corn Laws were a legislative coup for the emergent industrial classes 
who were seeking cheaper costs, including labor costs that included the cost of 
food used to reproduce their labor force. The wealth of the landed classes was 
seriously impaired as a result of the Corn Laws. 
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Like Madoff, Melmotte’s pack of cards collapsed with prob-
lems of liquidity. He was required to honor a promissory note 
that he had issued in exchange for title to the mansion that he 
had renovated and occupied. Melmotte had funds to cover the 
obligation, but he had transferred his entire fortune out of the 
reach of his creditors into a safe-harbor of his daughter. The lat-
ter had been abused by Melmotte for years and avenged herself 
by denying her father access to the funds in his time of need. In 
18th century parlance, Melmotte did not have “the readies” and 
was not able to meet the call on the note. He was destroyed by 
a liquidity crisis and shortly afterwards committed suicide with 
poison, a more spectacular exit than the ignominious departure 
by Madoff. 
Like Trollope (Melmotte), Marx is also recommended read-
ing by Daniel Gross. Gross [2009] cautions that texts like Capital 
(and we might add, Keynes’s General Theory [1936]) are “…
much-mentioned but little read…routinely cited without really 
knowing what’s in them.” 
At this point, Trollope and Marx part company. Trollope was 
the victim of “historical forgetfulness”; Marx, however, was the 
victim of “historical revisionism.” Marx, in western literature, 
was never even “much-mentioned” because during the Cold War, 
Marx and Marxism were taboo. The mere mention of Marx was 
to risk the wrath of McCarthyism. 
In the U.S.S.R., Marx was “much mentioned and routinely 
cited” by Stalin, Mao, Poll-Pot, and other mass murders. They 
shared with western historians the bad habit of never actually 
having read the original. Indeed, in the U.S.S.R., leading Marxist 
economists and high-school students only read received texts, 
usually simplistic renditions commissioned by Joe Stalin. It 
was Stalin’s contention that since the U.S.S.R. had transcended 
capitalism and had inaugurated “living socialism,” Marxism was 
no longer relevant. Marx’s primary text, Capital, the analysis of 
capitalism was no longer pertinent to the U.S.S.R. 
Like Trollope, Marx’s Capital speaks eloquently about our 
present predicament. Contrary to popular belief, Marx’s Capital, 
Volume 1, is neither a diatribe against capitalism nor a cel-
ebration of Communism. As Ernest Mandel [1975] notes in his 
introduction, “…the fundamental aim was to lay bare the laws 
of motion which govern the origins, the rise, the development, 
the decline and the disappearance of…the capitalism mode of 
production….It is…an analysis of the Anatomy of Capitalism” 
[Marx, 1977, p. 12].
How does Capital address today’s world-wide malaise? Marx 
6
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begins with capitalism’s elemental or cellular form, the com-
modity. The “commodity” for Marx is not just the commonsense 
notion of a thing that is bought and sold; its most important 
variant is the labor commodity. Marx’s commodity possesses in-
herent contradictions and, therefore, inherent instabilities. This 
is not just the vulgar or simplistic notion that labor is “exploit-
ed” (which, of course, is correct), but much more importantly, 
the market quest for surplus value (profit) frequently stands in 
opposition to the socially valuable aspect of a commodity (its 
use value). This contradictory feature is the source of social 
eruptions. 
Instances of the opposition are legion; e.g., U.S. healthcare 
for profit; banking for profit, and education for sale. Another 
example is Enron’s cutting off electricity supplies in California, 
nicely timed blackouts in the height of summer, to blackmail 
California into accepting punishing price increases. Enron also 
pulled the same stunt on 29 third-world (vulnerable and eas-
ily corruptible) countries. Enron hijacked the water, electricity, 
and gas supplies of these countries, using contracts established, 
sanctioned, and enforced with the blessing of the IMF, which 
then aided and abetted the compelling of punitive price in- 
creases.7 The West Virginia mining disaster “pit” costs against 
safety. Exxon Valdez and BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill ex-
posed the tension between fuel needs and safety/nature/liveli-
hoods. Finally, there is the case of the pollution of Paris’ public-
water supply that stampeded citizens into purchasing (privately 
owned) bottled water. 
While American and some European workers cower at 
threats of redundancy and off-shoring their jobs, there is under-
reported labor unrest in China, Greece, Spain, and other regions 
of the globe. The inherent instabilities of the labor commodity 
are on the rise in different parts of the world.8 Like Trollope, the 
lessons from Marx’s analysis are as pertinent today as they were 
7  There were street riots protesting the increases in some countries. Enron 
police assisted in putting down the riots and a number of protestors died. 
8  The U.S. Administration was slow to grasp the significance of the financial 
instabilities in the euro-zone to protect U.S. interests. Eighty % of IMF capital is 
financed by the U.S., and the IMF was a major partner in imposing an austerity 
package in the Greek rescue. Spain, Portugal, and Ireland are waiting in line. 
Street rioters in Greece openly branded the U.S. for the austerity deal. American 
banks came a close second as the institutional villains who had precipitated the 
crisis. To add a further systematic risk complication to the mix, the Greek banks 
owed nearly $100 billion to German and French banks (The German-led rescue 
was not entirely altruistic.). 
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in 1860. 
Marx’s opus is a careful analysis of Capital(ism). Develop-
ing from our earlier work [Neimark and Tinker, 1987], we show 
that Marx [1977, 1992] and his modern-day “students,” notably 
Theodore Adorno, cited extensively in the original 1977 text, 
has, like Anthony Trollope, a great deal to say about the present 
crises [Ryan, 1982; Dews, 1986].
First and foremost, both Marx and Adorno argue that 
capitalism’s crises cannot be resolved or cured; they can only be 
postponed, deferred, or transformed. This is because the under-
lying contradictions of capitalism remain undisturbed, so that 
the deep-rooted antinomies remain ever-present [Gamble and 
Walton, 1976].
Before proceeding, it is important how much we can take 
from Marx directly and how much we must draw on those who 
use his mode of analysis. Marx wrote at a time when European 
nations were still predominantly agrarian economies with a 
growing migration of labor from country to town. The industrial 
bourgeoisie was still an emergent class. There were no monopo-
lies on today’s scale. 
Notwithstanding the temporal limitations of Marx’s Capital, 
Vol. 1, his legacy is a mode of analysis that endures and allows 
contemporary Marxists to deploy in examining the present. For 
instance, his identification of surplus value (profit and taxes) 
as an expropriation from “productive” activity is expressed 
today in the generation of massive quantities of surplus values 
by corporations and the state. Modern-day analysis focuses on 
where the surpluses (profits and taxes) are deployed [Sweezy 
and Baron, 1966; Mandel, 1975]. For Mandel, for instance, the 
military has become the primary recipient of the surplus-value 
largesse, thereby creating a new “department” in the economy 
and offering an analysis not too remote from Eisenhower’s 1961 
warning about the Military-Industrial Complex. More recent 
studies concentrate on the speculative destabilizing movements 
engendered by the surpluses extracted by the banking sector, 
used to pump-and-dump entire stock markets [Cooper, 2008; 
Balakrishnan, 2009]. 
We begin by reviewing four contradictory dimensions of the 
present crisis. Each positions the issues using the classics (Marx 
and Marxists) and extends the discussion to the present crisis. 
The four dimensions are the realization crisis, the concentration 
of capital, the centralization of capital, and the misalignment 
between identity and non-identity.
8
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THE FOUR DIMENSIONS
The Realization Crisis: “Pump-and-Dump,” “bubble-blow-
ing,” and “bubble-bursting” are not phrases invented by the 
“loony-left” but are deployed by contemporary economic com-
mentators when pondering the state of the world-wide economic 
crisis [Krugman, 2009; Posner, 2009]. Their meditations focus 
on bubble-blowing by banks and, more recently, bubble-blowing 
by nation states and their multiple stimulus packages [Tinker, 
1992; Sy and Tinker, 2009]. What these analysts fail to ask is 
why bubble-blowing was such a vital and necessary part of the 
modern capitalist enterprise?9 The answer is to be found in the 
forbidden texts. 
Competitive capitalism strives for greater profit, either 
through socially destructive speculation or by seeking ever 
greater efficiency by producing “more-with-less” [Allen, 1975; 
Shaw, 1975; Gamble and Walton, 1976; Braverman, 1998]. 
“More-with-less” means shedding labor. To avoid adding to the 
masses of unemployed, capitalism must absorb the discarded 
laborers, either by finding them gainful employment (economic 
growth is the prime candidate as long as this can be sustained 
by “bubble-blowing”) or by absorbing surplus labor by using 
public-sector employment (the U.S. Postal Service, the military, 
etc.) [Mandel, 1975; Gamble and Walton, 1976; Braverman, 
1998]. 
The problem with the second solution is that it has a finite 
limit. The U.S. Postal Service is seriously overstaffed, and fur-
ther expenditures would inflame congressional fears of a new 
inflationary crisis, instigated by government deficit spending 
that would earn the wrath of the bond market.10 Nor is military 
spending a sustainable option. Drone and other labor-saving 
technologies reduce the required number of military person-
9  Alan Greenspan opined as such in his testimony before Congress where he 
ridiculed members for their hypocritical change of heart. When the bubble was 
swelling, he was their darling and had their undying support. When the bubble 
burst, they turned on him like a pack of wolves. Senator Dodd of Connecticut, 
where all the bank and insurance lobby money resides, performed a spectacular 
somersault on these issues. 
 
10  Inflation increases the rates that the bond market must pay on new issues. 
Bonds issued prior to the inflation period will fall in value to give returns com-
mensurate with the new market rates. Bondholders of those portfolios would suf-
fer major losses. Accordingly, the bond market, four times larger than the market 
of stocks and shares, hates inflation and lobbies heavily against deficit spending 
[Cooper, 2008]. 
9
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nel for absorbing surplus labor. As public disquiet about the 
death-toll of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan rises, there is growing 
pressure to replace “men with machines” [Mandel, 1975; Braver-
man, 1998].
We are also hitting the wall for the first option on the list 
– inflating demand with credit or bubble-blowing. Maynard 
Keynes is dead! Anyone who has read The General Theory 
[Keynes, 1936] would know that Keynes only advised using a 
stimulus in the nadir of a depression (never preemptively) and 
that a Keynesian stimulus only works in a semi-closed economy. 
Today’s economies have extensive import-export relations, there-
by mitigating the effects of a state-induced stimulus. This is the 
reason for the tepid impact of the current stimulus packages 
[Balakrishnan, 2009]. 
The first option, credit expansion by bubble-blowing by 
corporations and banks, is also unavailable as these avenues 
are closed-off. The real-estate bubble has burst, the housing 
market is languishing, credit cards are over-extended. Dubai’s 
real-estate now sports more cranes than building occupancies, 
student loans are a slow-burning crisis, the Shanghai real-estate 
bubble has been pricked by Chinese authorities. In the U.S. and 
the U.K., mortgage delinquencies threaten to escalate as citizens 
without jobs face come-due, first-time balloon payments. 
One prognosis as to the future of capitalism may be found 
in the writings of Adam Smith and his contemporaries that, in 
the long term, capitalism will gravitate to a steady-state [Bal-
akrishnan, 2009]. What this thesis fails to grasp is the dynamic 
character of capitalism, its ability in the past to “invent” its way 
out of crisis by destroying and then replenishing the capital 
stock of entire countries like Germany and Japan with Marshal 
Plan and today Iraq. However, today seems to be different with 
stubbornly high levels of unemployment and the ominous pos-
sibility of social unrest in the U.S. already evident on a global 
scale, led perhaps somewhat ironically by Greece, the cradle of 
western civilization [Marx, 1977; Braverman, 1998].
The Concentration of Capital: The concentration of capital refers 
to the growing size of banks and corporations.11 The savings and 
11  Marx [1977, Vol. 1, p. 887] elaborates on these contradictions as they ap-
plied in the 1850’s (and as they relate now): “...The concentration of capital with-
in a country and the dissolving effect of this concentration present nothing but 
positive sides to him [Carey]. But the monopoly of concentrated English capital 
has a dissolving effect on the smaller national capitals of other countries and is 
disharmonious….these world-market disharmonies are merely the ultimate ad-
10
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loans crisis of the 1970’s was “deferred” by absorbing bad banks 
into good and larger ones. The same tactic was redeployed for 
engaging the current crisis. To avoid bank collapses and a sys-
temic meltdown, presaged by Lehman Brothers, banks were per-
mitted to engage in an unprecedented program of mergers and 
acquisitions. Bear Sterns was absorbed by J.P. Morgan for $29 
million; Bank of America “saved” Merrill Lynch for $130 mil-
lion; Northern Rock, the Abbey, and Bradford and Bingley were 
absorbed in the U.K.; Wakovia went to Wells Fargo; WAMU to 
Bank of America; Morgan Stanley to Mitsubishi; and Fortis and 
Dextor were swallowed in French, Dutch, and Belgian bailouts. 
Consolidating banks does not “solve” problems; it merely 
transformed them into new and larger contradictions, setting 
the scene for future crises. These new mega-banks are now even 
bigger, too big to save by their host countries, and their size 
magnifies ever further the degree of systematic risk. A mega-
bank collapse will have unprecedented reverberations through 
the world financial system because bank interconnectedness is 
now pervasive. 
 Figure 1 is a “too big-to-save” table. It assigns the world’s 
largest 25 banks to their host country and expresses their com-
bined leverage of that country’s GDP. Ireland and Greece do not 
appear, not because their situation is not dire, but because their 
banks and GDP are not large enough in absolute terms to quali-
fy for consideration. This is a limitation of Figure 1, a drawback 
with these data because, as we have seen in recent months, the 
euro can be jeopardized by a minnow like Greece and via the 
IMF, there is a contagion effect that threatens to embroil the 
U.S.
The voracious, expansive proclivities of capitalism are 
represented by the expansion of the commodity form (Marx, 
1977, pp. 700-883). Congress because of lobbying is now com-
moditized such that banking regulation is subordinated to the 
dictates of market forces, personified by “the lobbyist” [Stigler, 
1971; Sy and Tinker, 2009]. Even the Volker rule (the firewall for 
segregating high-risk investment banking from federally insured 
deposits in commercial banks) has fallen afoul of the powerful 
banking lobby [Stigler, 1971; Sy and Tinker, 2009]. Thus, if a 
equate expression of the disharmonies which have become fixed as abstract rela-
tions with the economic categories or which have a local existence on the smallest 
scale. No wonder, then, that he [Carey] forgets the positive content of these pro-
cesses of dissolution...” 
11
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FIGURE 1
Too-Big-To-Fail Index: Top 50 Banks’
Leverage as a % of Their Country’s GDP
COUNTRY
TOP 50 BANKS’ LEVERAGE 
AS A PERCENTAGEOF THEIR 
HOST COUNTRY’S GDP
Switzerland 595.32
Netherlands 336.86
Belgium 318.84
United Kingdom 
 
206.21
France 198.07
Hong Kong 154.74
Spain 
 
107.77
Japan 102.16
Sweden 82.96
Australia 82.07
Italy 70.32
China 63.26
Germany 49.88
United States 44.19
Canada 28.80
Source:
Eurobank 
http: / /www.euromoney.com/
Article/1961042/Worlds-largest-
banks-2007-Global-bank-rank-
ings-Top-20-global-free-to-access.
html
Source:
Euromoney
http: / /www.euromoney.com/
Article/1533691/Worlds-largest-
banks-Global-bank-rankings-Top-
50-by-shareholder-equity-free-to-
access.html
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future Goldman Sachs suffered catastrophic losses in, say, the 
Hungarian, Russian, or Romanian stock markets, wiping bil-
lions of assets off its balance sheet, it would be U.S. taxpayers 
who would be obliged to pick up the tab to protect U.S. federally 
insured depositors.
The travails of the euro began with Greece, but grumblings 
in Ireland, Spain, and Portugal have spooked international 
financial markets, including the U.S. The IMF (with its U.S. pay-
master) saved Greek banks which owed $50 billion and $80 bil-
lion to French and German banks respectively. So the U.S. is in-
directly, but very significantly ensnared, in euro travails. And in 
Germany, the bailout is costing Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party 
dearly in the polls. The German voters do not like the Greeks! 
Back in the U.S, the stock market dimly perceived that the 
fate of the euro is not just a “foreign” problem. The geographical 
growth of the commodity form in banking means that when the 
euro sneezes, the U.S. will catch cold.
The Growing Centralization of Capital: Centralization of capital, 
in popular parlance, refers to the manner in which control of 
capital is in the hands of fewer and fewer persons. In this re-
gard, centralization and concentration move in lock step.12 How-
ever, Marx’s definition of “concentration” is a variance from this 
popular notion. For Marx [1977, Vol. 1, Chapter XXXIII], “…
Centralization of the means of production and socialization of 
labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with 
their capitalist integument. Thus integument is burst asunder. 
The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropria-
tors are expropriated.” 
For Marx, in his time, his notion of centralization focused 
on the revolutionary potential of increasingly socialized, in-
creasingly socially conscious, factory labor. In his era, the so-
cially disruptive potential of factory labor was amplified through 
trade-union organization and even political representation (e.g., 
the Labour Party and the Fabian Society in the U.K.). 
Today’s trade unions in the U.K. and the U.S. are a shadowy 
version of their earlier potency. It is easy to rush to the conclu-
sion that Marx’s tocsin is no longer relevant today given the 
12  This popular definition serves the convenient ideological purpose of per-
sonifying the source of crises in terms of “villains and bad people,” to paraphrase 
President Bush. This ploy diverts attention away from the real source of crises, 
not “bad people” (the market can simply replace them with more highly qualified 
bad people) but contradictions in the underlying social system. 
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emasculated condition of trade unions. However, this misappre-
hends Marx’s analysis that does not depend on the presence and 
form of the trade-union movement. The basic social antinomy to 
which Marx refers is not socially and institutionally specific but 
is capable of assuming different institutional guises at different 
points in history. 
The basic dissonance persists today, but today assumes new 
forms. The social self-consciousness that evolves from Marx’s 
“centralization of the means of production and socialization of 
labor” is reflected in the awareness displayed by rioters in Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece (“IMF, go home”). The insurrectionists 
at Toronto’s G8 meeting (“kill the bankers”) and the agitators 
behind the growing number of strikes for better wages and ben-
efits in China echo similar sentiments.
The Misalignment between Identity and Non-Identity: The “clash” 
between identity and non-identity is perhaps the most pertinent 
and theoretically challenging addition offered in this update. 
Best elucidated by Adorno [1973] and Adorno and Horkhiemer 
[1979], this “clash” describes the rupture between a social self-
consciousness (whether of an individual or a collective) and the 
historical milieu in which that self-consciousness is embedded.13 
The rupture or clash refers to the manner in which conscious-
ness or self-awareness always lags behind its evolving historical 
milieu. 
Hegel [1967, p. 13, 1975, pp. xiii, 4, 70; see also Lukacs, 
1971, p. 59] expresses this relation succinctly: “Only when dusk 
starts to fall does the Owl of Minerva spread its wings and fly.” 
In the same vein, Marx notes that “…the conventional philoso-
pher always arrives after the feast has ended.” (“post-festum”).14
 In contrast with this backward-looking recollection “at 
dusk” (the “post-festum” analysis of the traditional intellectual), 
Gramsci’s [1971, pp. 404-405] organic intellectual is an active 
ingredient in social change (a dialectical dynamic of interven-
13  “An object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains some-
thing other than the subject whereas a subject by its very nature is from the outset 
an object as well. Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an 
object, but we can conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is 
part of the meaning of objectivity to be a subject” [Adorno, 1973, p. 183].
14  “Hegel’s…absolute spirit qua absolute spirit makes history only in appear-
ance….For, as absolute spirit does not appear in the mind of the philosopher in 
the shape of the creative world-spirit until after the event, it follows that it makes 
history only in the consciousness, the opinions and the ideas of the philosophers, 
only in the speculative imagination” [Marx, quoted in Lukacs, 1971, p. 16].
14
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tion and change; not a static, bifurcated Cartesian subject-object 
split, but a philosophy where object and subject constantly re-
constitute each other, albeit imperfectly): 
…the philosophy of praxis is a reform and a develop-
ment of Hegelianism; it is a philosophy that has been 
liberated (or is attempting to liberate itself) from any 
unilateral and fanatical ideological elements; it is con-
sciousness full of contradictions, in which the philoso-
pher himself, understood both individually and as an 
entire social group, not only grasps the contradictions, 
but posits himself as an element of the contradiction 
and elevates this element to a principle of knowledge 
and therefore action.15 
The essence of the proposition that “reality” always exceeds 
consciousness means that reality is always capable of delivering 
nasty surprises. In the language of dialectics, the “negation-of-
negation” is never a complete apprehension of reality but always 
something less, a synthesis with remainder. This remainder is 
the unexplained residual (surprise) that provides the accelerant 
for the next historical movement. 
Today’s world-wide crisis provides a practical example of 
dialectics in action. The crisis was precipitated in no small mea-
sure by a banking crisis. This “negation” has been “negated” by 
a faint-hearted regulatory reform, an imperfect expression of 
Adorno’s public consciousness. The negation-of-negation never 
provides a definitive, final, or absolute closure, but always leaves 
a remainder or a residual out of which future crises will emerge. 
These insights from Marxist dialectics, as formulated by 
Theodore Adorno and cited extensively in our 1987 text [Nei-
mark and Tinker, 1987], articulates in a systematic matter what 
is suspected in popular understandings of the banking crisis. 
Banks successfully resisted the Basle lll efforts to impose higher 
equity cushions. They defeated restrictions on leverage levels 
and a collective levy to fund the cost of future bailouts. U.S. 
banking legislation is also floundering in Congress, with the 
Volker rule seemingly dead in the water already. The banking 
lobby successfully resisted these regulations by arguing that, in 
their present parlous state, any restrictions might fatally desta-
bilize the entire banking system, precipitating a new and even 
15  In such a fashion, Hegel/Gramsci’s Organic Owl appears on time for Marx’s 
banquet and enjoins the guests with a “steak” in the future (becoming an histori-
cal player in making history). 
15
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greater crisis.16
The result of these insipid, negation-of-negation reforms is 
to set the scene for the next financial crisis. Since the previous 
crisis, systemic risk has increased. Banking entities are now 
really too big to save, and the firewalls between high-risk invest-
ment banking and commercial (high street) banking have been 
dismantled. These were provisional “solutions” that sewed the 
seeds for the next crisis. 
Yet, banks may not be the epicenter of the next crisis. Na-
tion states, including the euro-zone, are increasingly vulnerable 
to defaults, not just for their sovereign government debt, but 
also for default of their private banking sectors, as in the case 
of the loan exposure of German banks to Greek banks. Already 
bailout fatigue is setting-in in Germany, and new euro-zone 
zombies (Spain, Portugal, Ireland) may be thrown to the wolves 
by German voters. 
The outcome for these “the three amigos” may not be pretty. 
Their government and bank bonds will be downgraded to junk 
status with increasing interest rates to prohibitive levels. This 
will impose additional severe burden on their government defi-
cits with likely violations of the debt covenants of IMF and euro 
loans triggering further penalties. And so the dialectical round-
about begins again, this time with greater speed. 
Citizens are not likely to sit quietly by and accept draco-
nian cutbacks in jobs, social services, and benefits. People who 
lose the ability to pay the rent, buy food for their children, and 
maintain healthcare payments, etc. are unlikely to remain qui-
escent in a crisis not of their making. At the time of writing, the 
renewal of unemployment benefits has stalled in the U.S. Con-
gress, with Republicans demanding that the benefits be funded 
from cuts elsewhere. Street protests in Canada against the G20 
and those in Greece were not amicable. It would be foolish to 
continue to deny that social instability is not a real possibility.
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